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Sovereign Immunity for Rent: How the 
Commodification of Tribal Sovereign 
Immunity Reflects the Failures of the 
U.S. Patent System 
Katrina Grace Geddes* 
 
Last year, a Fortune 500 pharmaceutical company attempted to 
rent the sovereign immunity of an American Indian tribe in order to 
shield its patents on a dry-eye drug from invalidation by generic 
competitors in inter partes review. Pharmaceutical firms are 
notorious for pursuing unconventional methods to extend the 
duration of their patents and, in this sense, the maneuver is 
unsurprising. The exploitation, however, of an historically 
disenfranchised community with limited economic opportunities is 
particularly unsettling. This Article will provide, firstly, a factual 
summary of the legal background of this case; secondly, a review of 
the February 2018 decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
(“PTAB”) to deny the application of tribal sovereign immunity in 
this case; thirdly, a review of the July 2018 decision of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, affirming the PTAB’s 
decision; fourthly, a discussion of the ways in which the precedent 
set by Allergan’s maneuver may adversely affect consumer welfare 
by undermining the process of inter partes review; fifthly, an 
analysis of the history of tribal sovereign immunity and how its 
exploitation in this case reflects the historic oppression of American 
Indians; and finally, strategies to deter such transactions from 
recurring in the future. 
                                                                                                             
*  Katrina Geddes is a Research Fellow at Harvard Law School and the Berkman Klein 
Center for Internet and Society in Cambridge, Massachusetts; M.P.P., Harvard University; 
L.L.M., Cambridge University; L.L.B., University of New South Wales.  
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Allergan’s dry-eye treatment Restasis® was approved in 2002, 
and its patents (issued in 1995 and 1999)1 were set to expire in 2014. 
However, in 2013, Allergan obtained new patents claiming new uses 
of the drug, thereby extending patent protection to 2024.2 In 2015, 
Allergan filed suit against Teva Pharmaceuticals, Akorn, and 
Mylan, alleging that each of the generic manufacturers had infringed 
their Restasis® patents by filing Abbreviated New Drug 
Applications (“ANDAs”) for bioequivalent drugs.3 The defendants 
responded that the Restasis® patents were invalid on several 
grounds, and, in October 2017, the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Texas agreed that the patents were invalid for 
obviousness.4 Allergan is appealing the court’s ruling, which will 
now be heard by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.5 
                                                                                                             
1 U.S. Patent No. 5,474,979; U.S. Patent No. 5,981,607. 
2 See Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 
4803941, at *10 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017). 
3 Id. at *13. 
4 Id. at *65. 
5 Press Release, Allergan, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas Issues 
Adverse Trial Decision Concerning RESTASIS® (Cyclosporine Ophthalmic Emulsion) 
0.05% Patents (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.allergan.com/news/news/thomson-reuters/u-
s-district-court-for-the-eastern-district-of-tex [https://perma.cc/9QW3-2WDJ]. An appeal 
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Meanwhile, on June 3, 2016, Mylan filed six inter partes review 
(“IPR”) challenges with the PTAB regarding the Restasis® patents,6 
and, on December 8, 2016, the PTAB granted its petitions to be 
heard. On September 8, 2017, less than a week before the oral 
hearing set for September 15, counsel for the Saint Regis Mohawk 
Tribe (“the Tribe”) contacted the PTAB to inform the Board that 
they had acquired the challenged patents and sought a motion to 
dismiss the proceedings based on the Tribe’s sovereign immunity.7 
On September 8, 2017, the Tribe had entered into a patent 
assignment agreement with Allergan in which the latter had 
transferred to the former a set of U.S. patents and patent applications 
related to Restasis®.8 On the same day, both parties also entered into 
a Patent License Agreement in which the Tribe granted Allergan “an 
‘irrevocable, perpetual, transferable, and exclusive license’ under 
the challenged patents ‘for all FDA-approved uses in the United 
States.’”9 In exchange, Allergan paid the Tribe $13.75 million and 
promised $15 million in royalties annually.10 “The License 
Agreement expressly stated that the Tribe ‘will and shall assert its 
sovereign immunity in any Contested PTO Proceeding, including in 
the IPR Proceedings.”11 
In the media storm that followed this announcement, amicus 
briefs were filed before the PTAB by a variety of different 
commentators and interest groups. The Software Alliance 
highlighted the irrelevance of patent immunity to the preservation 
                                                                                                             
was filed on November 1, 2017. Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 18-1130 
(Fed. Cir. Jan. 9, 2018). 
6 U.S. Patent No. 8,685,930; U.S. Patent No. 8,629,111; U.S. Patent No. 8,642,556; 
U.S. Patent No. 8,633,162; U.S. Patent No. 8,648,048; U.S. Patent No. 9,248,191. 
7 Elana Williams, Note, Tribal Sovereign Immunity as a Defense in Overcoming IPR 
Challenges of Brand Name Pharmaceutical Patent Validity at PTAB—Effects on the 
Industry, 18 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y 40 , 57 (2018) at 48.  
8 Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. IPR2016-01127, at 5, 2018 WL 
1100950, at *2 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018). 
9 Id. at 6. 
10 Id. 
11 Caleb A. Bates et al., Sovereign Immunity and Inter partes Review, KNOBBE MARTENS: 
BIOTECH. BLOG (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.knobbe.com/news/2017/10/sovereign-
immunity-and-inter-partes-review [https://perma.cc/SDH2-Q9QW]. 
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of tribal sovereignty for self-governance,12 while the Public 
Knowledge and the Electronic Frontier Foundation argued that IPR 
is a public-interest administrative proceeding with broader societal 
ramifications, unlike private litigation.13 The Association for 
Accessible Medicines echoed these sentiments, calling on the PTAB 
to protect the public’s paramount interest in containing patent 
monopolies within their legitimate scope.14 On the other side, the 
Oglala Sioux Tribe called for greater respect for tribal decisions 
regarding revenue streams, economic development, and financial 
self-sufficiency.15 Similarly, the Seneca Nation called for continued 
deference to Congress regarding the abrogation of tribal sovereign 
immunity.16 The Native American Intellectual Property Enterprise 
Council emphasized the “vital support” offered by the patent 
assignment to “one of the groups in most need of economic and 
educational assistance in the United States.”17 Inventor advocacy 
organization U.S. Inventor, LLC emphasized that only Congress has 
the authority to qualify or limit tribal sovereign immunity,18 and the 
National Congress of American Indians, the National Indian 
Gaming Association, and the United South and Eastern Tribes 
highlighted the shared common law origins of state and tribal 
sovereign immunity and the importance of deference to Congress 
regarding their abrogation.19 Patent attorneys Luis Ortiz and Kermit 
Lopez emphasized that sovereign immunity is a core legal 
                                                                                                             
12 Brief of BSA The Software All. as Amicus Regarding Applicability of Tribal 
Sovereign Immunity in IPR Proceedings at 5, Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-01127. 
13 Brief of Pub. Knowledge and the Elec. Frontier Found. as Amici Collegii in 
Opposition to the Motion to Terminate at 2–3, Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-01127. 
14 Brief of the Ass’n for Accessible Meds. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 
2, Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-01127. 
15 Brief of the Oglala Sioux Tribe as Amicus Curiae in Support of Corrected Patent 
Owner’s Motion to Dismiss Based on Tribal Sovereign Immunity at 5, Mylan Pharm., No. 
IPR2016-01127 [hereinafter Oglala Sioux Tribe Brief]. 
16 Brief of the Seneca Nation as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Patent Owner, Saint 
Regis Mohawk Tribe at 2, Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-01127. 
17 Brief of Native Am. Intellectual Prop. Enter. Council, Inc. as Amicus Curiae 
Regarding Patent Owner’s Motion to Dismiss at 6, Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-01127 
[hereinafter NAIPEC Brief]. 
18 Brief of U.S. Inventor, LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Patent Owner, the Saint 
Regis Mohawk Tribe at 5–6, Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-01127. 
19 Brief of the Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians et al. as Amici Curiae in support of Patent 
Holder the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe’s Motion to Dismiss at 4, Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-
01127. 
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protection for American Indian tribes, and claimed that the PTAB 
“has no congressional imprimatur to determine whether tribal 
sovereign immunity applies in an IPR.”20 
The case also received significant attention from non-legal 
stakeholders, including a coalition of prominent U.S. health care 
organizations, led by America’s Health Insurance Plans, American 
Hospital Association, and American College of Physicians. This 
coalition urged congressional leaders to “fully examine” Allergan’s 
“brazen attempt to circumvent U.S. law” that, if left unchallenged, 
could “represent the beginning of a lucrative business strategy at the 
expense of the public interest; thus jeopardizing timely access to 
lower-cost generic and biosimilar medicines.”21 In March 2018, 
Senators Tom Cotton, Claire McCaskill, David Perdue, Joni Ernst, 
and Pat Toomey introduced the “Preserving Access to Cost 
Effective Drugs Act,” which would prevent patent holders from 
asserting sovereign immunity as a defense in any reexamination 
proceeding, including any appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board, any inter partes review, any post-grant review, or any 
subsequent review of any of these proceedings by a U.S. court.22 
The bill has been referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.23 
On February 23, 2018, the PTAB delivered its decision denying 
the Tribe’s motion to terminate inter partes review on the basis of 
its tribal sovereign immunity. The Board held that “the Tribe has not 
established that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity should be 
applied to these proceedings. Furthermore, we determine that these 
proceedings can continue even without the Tribe’s participation in 
view of Allergan’s retained ownership interests in the challenged 
patents.”24 The details of this judgment are elucidated in Section III. 
Following this decision, Allergan appealed to the U.S. Court of 
                                                                                                             
20 Brief of Luis Ortiz and Kermit Lopez as Amicus Curiae in Support of Patent Owner’s 
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Based on Tribal Sovereign Immunity at 11, 
Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-01127. 
21 All. of Cmty. Health Plans et al., Health Care Organizations Letter on Allergan 
Restasis, ASS’N FOR ACCESSIBLE MEDS. 1, 3 (Oct. 10, 2017), 
https://www.accessiblemeds.org/sites/default/files/2017-10/Health-Care-Organizations-
Letter-on-Allergan-Restasis-10-10-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KFH-EJPT]. 
22 Preserving Access to Cost Effective Drugs Act, S. 2514, 115th Cong. (2018). 
23 See S.2514, 115th Cong. (as introduced in Senate, Mar. 7, 2018). 
24 Mylan Pharm, No. IPR2016-01127, at 4, 2018 WL 1100950, at *2. 
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Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which heard oral arguments on June 
4, 2018.25 During the hearing, the court explored the question of 
whether inter partes review represents a reconsideration of an 
administrative agency’s prior decision or whether it more closely 
resembles civil litigation between two private parties.26 Jonathan 
Massey, representing Allergan, argued that inter partes review 
“bears all the trappings of a federal civil action” and therefore that 
tribal sovereign immunity should apply.27 Eric Miller, for the 
defendants, argued that there were two critical features that 
distinguished IPR from civil litigation: firstly, how the process 
begins (the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(“USPTO”) has discretion to deny an IPR petition, unlike the 
adjudicator in a civil suit); and secondly, how the process ends (in 
an IPR, the only possible outcome for the patentee is the cancellation 
of a public franchise issued by an administrative agency).28 Miller 
argued that the consequence of the USPTO Director’s decision to 
initiate an IPR is not that the Tribe is hailed into court by a private 
party, but that “a politically accountable official at an executive 
branch agency has made a decision” to reconsider a prior agency 
action.29 
Mark Freeman, representing the U.S. Department of Justice, 
agreed that “just because the petition . . . was begun by a petition by 
a private party that it was the private party’s cancellation of the 
patent.”30 Freeman reiterated that “it’s the USPTO’s decision to 
reconsider [the grant of a patent],” and “because this is our decision, 
for which we are accountable, it is an act of the United States 
government, against which an Indian tribe does not have sovereign 
immunity.31 And for that reason, we would urge the court to hold 
that the Board correctly said this proceeding can proceed.”32 
                                                                                                             
25 See Oral Argument, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322 
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (No. 2018-1638), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-
recordings?title=&field_case_number_value=18-1638&field_date_value2%5Bvalue
%5D%5Bdate%5D= [https://perma.cc/5VH9-R9PQ]. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
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Although the court expressed skepticism at the oral arguments for 
both sides, it agreed that the “strongest argument” for the defendants 
was “the discretion of the [USPTO] director to initiate the 
proceeding or not.”33 The court also made several references to the 
harmful precedent set by the “deliberate circumvention of the IPR 
process by buying sovereign immunity,” asking Massey, “many 
pharmaceutical or other companies could simply enter into the same 
type of transaction with an Indian tribe, where does that leave the 
IPR process?” Freeman also described the transaction as a “shell 
game” and encouraged the court to preserve the Board’s decision.34 
On July 20, 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit handed down its judgment, affirming the PTAB’s decision 
to deny the Tribe’s motion to terminate inter partes review on the 
basis of its tribal sovereign immunity. The details of this judgment 
are explored in Section IV. 
II. DECISION OF THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD 
The Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s February 2018 decision 
can be summarized in four parts: 
 There is no controlling precedent or statutory 
basis for the application of tribal immunity in 
inter partes review proceedings; 
 Tribal immunity does not apply to inter partes 
review proceedings; 
 These particular proceedings may continue with 
Allergan’s participation; and 
 The Tribe is not an indispensable party. 
With respect to its first assertion, the Board found that, although 
case law had established that state sovereign immunity can be 
exercised as a defense in adjudicatory proceedings before federal 
agencies,35 the Tribe had failed to provide any federal court or Board 
                                                                                                             
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 743–44 (2002) (“State 
sovereign immunity’s preeminent purpose—to accord States the dignity that is consistent 
with their status as sovereign entities—and the overwhelming similarities between FMC 
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precedent suggesting that this principle should be extended to an 
assertion of tribal sovereign immunity in similar proceedings.36 
Furthermore, the Board highlighted statements by the Supreme 
Court that “‘the immunity possessed by Indian tribes is not 
coextensive with that of the States.’”37 Finally, the Board was 
reluctant to permit the application of non-statutory defenses in IPR 
proceedings.38 In view of the differences between tribal and state 
sovereign immunity, the absence of relevant precedent, and the lack 
of statutory authority, the Board declined the Tribe’s request to 
invoke tribal sovereign immunity as a defense in the inter partes 
review.39 
With respect to its second assertion, the Board exhibited strong 
deference to Congress with respect to the scope of applicability of 
federal laws to Indian tribes. The Ninth Circuit has stated that:  
[A] federal statute of general applicability that is 
silent on the issue of applicability to Indian tribes 
will not apply to [Indian tribes] if: (1) the law touches 
“exclusive rights of self-governance in purely 
intramural matters”; (2) the application of the law to 
the tribe would “abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian 
treaties”; or (3) there is proof “by legislative history 
or some other means that Congress intended [the 
law] not to apply to Indians on their 
reservations . . . .”40 
The Board found that, as none of these requirements had been 
met in this particular case, there was no basis for finding that the 
generally applicable America Invents Act was not applicable to 
                                                                                                             
adjudicative proceedings and civil litigation lead to the conclusion that the FMC is barred 
from adjudicating a private party’s complaint against a nonconsenting State.”). 
36 Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-01127, at 8, 2018 WL 1100950, at *3. 
37 Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998); see also Three 
Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877,  
890 (1986). 
38 Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-01127, at 10, 2018 WL 1100950, at *4. 
39 Id. 
40 Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985) (second 
alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 
893–94 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
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Indian tribes.41 Furthermore, Indian tribes have generally “not 
enjoyed immunity in other types of federal administrative 
proceedings used to enforce generally applicable federal statutes.”42 
With respect to its third assertion, the Board explained that 
reconsideration of the patentability of issued patents via inter partes 
review is possible “without regard to the identity of the patent 
owner” because the Board does not exercise personal jurisdiction 
over the patent owner.43 It cannot restrain the patent owner from 
acting, nor compel it to act in any manner based on its final decision; 
the scope of the Board’s authority is limited to assessing the 
patentability of the challenged claims.44 The patent owner cannot be 
compelled to appear as a party in the proceedings, and numerous 
inter partes reviews have proceeded to a final written decision 
without the patent owner’s participation.45 Accordingly, the Board 
held that, even if the Tribe was entitled to assert immunity here, the 
proceedings could continue with the participation of Allergan, 
which did not enjoy such immunity, and which was, according to 
the Board, the “effective” patent owner.46 
The Board pointed to statements by the Federal Circuit that the 
“party that has been granted all substantial rights under the patent is 
considered the owner regardless of how the parties characterize the 
transaction that conveyed those rights.”47 Based on the terms of the 
license between Allergan and the Tribe, the Board found that 
Allergan was the effective patent owner in view of its possession of 
“all substantial rights” in relation to the patents, including the right 
to sue for infringement; the right to “indulge” any infringement; the 
right to make, use, and sell products or services under the patents; 
the right to sublicense; rights of reversion; the right to litigation or 
licensing proceeds; the right to control prosecution and other 
administrative proceedings; and the right to assign interests in the 
                                                                                                             
41 Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-01127, at 13, 2018 WL 1100950, at *5. 
42 Id. at 14, 2018 WL 1100950, at *5. 
43 Id. at 18, 2018 WL 1100950, at *7. 
44 Id. at 16, 2018 WL 1100950, at *6. 
45 Id. at 16–17, 2018 WL 1100950, at *6. 
46 Id. at 35, 2018 WL 1100950, at *13. 
47 Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Alfred 
E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
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patents.48 The Board found that the recordation of Allergan’s 
assignment of the patents to the Tribe at the USPTO only created “a 
rebuttable presumption regarding ownership.”49 The Board held that 
this presumption had been overcome, and that the proceedings could 
continue with Allergan’s sole participation, as the “effective patent 
owner,” regardless of whether tribal immunity applied.50 
This conclusion led the Board to its fourth and final assertion, 
that the inter partes review proceedings need not be terminated 
because the Tribe was not an indispensable party. The Board held 
that the Tribe would not “be significantly prejudiced in relation to 
the merits of the patentability challenges in these proceedings” if it 
did not participate based on its tribal immunity because Allergan, as 
the effective patent owner, would be able to “adequately represent 
any interests the Tribe may have in the challenged patents.”51 
Notably, the briefing and evidence on the substantive patentability 
issues at stake in these proceedings were completed before the 
Tribe’s involvement.52 Accordingly, the Board concluded that the 
Tribe had failed to show that it was entitled to assert tribal immunity 
in these proceedings, that it was not an indispensable party to the 
proceedings, and that the proceedings could continue with Allergan 
as the effective patent owner.53 The Board denied the Tribe’s motion 
to terminate the IPR proceedings.54 
III. DECISION OF THE U.S. COURT OF  
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
In an opinion delivered on July 20, 2018, Judge Moore 
distinguished this case from the facts of Federal Maritime 
Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority (“FMC”),55 in 
which the Supreme Court held that state sovereign immunity 
                                                                                                             
48 Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-01127, at 20–35, 2018 WL 1100950, at *8–13. 
49 Id. at 34, 2018 WL 1100950, at *13. 
50 Id. at 35, 2018 WL 1100950, at *13. 
51 Id. at 37–38, 2018 WL 1100950, at *14. 
52 Id. at 38, 2018 WL 1100950, at *14. 
53 Id. at 40, 2018 WL 1100950, at *15. 
54 Id. 
55 Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (citing Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 764 (2002)).  
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precluded the Federal Maritime Commission from adjudicating a 
private party’s complaint against a state-run port. What 
differentiated FMC from the present case, Moore reasoned, was that 
Commission adjudications bear “overwhelming” similarities to 
federal civil litigation between private parties, whereas IPR “is more 
like an agency enforcement action than a civil suit brought by a 
private party.”56 Judge Moore identified four characteristics that 
distinguished IPR from adjudication between private parties. First, 
the USPTO Director possesses broad discretion in deciding whether 
to institute review and this “embraces the entirety of the 
proceeding.”57 Accordingly, if IPR “proceeds on patents owned by 
a tribe, it is because a politically accountable, federal official has 
authorized the institution of that proceeding.”58 In contrast, the 
Federal Maritime Commission has no discretion to refuse to 
adjudicate complaints brought by private parties, meaning that a 
private party could “unilaterally hale a sovereign before a tribunal, 
presenting an affront to the dignity of the sovereign.”59 Secondly, 
following the initiation of an IPR, the Board may proceed with 
review even if the petitioner chooses not to participate, 
demonstrating IPR’s higher purpose of permitting a federal agency 
to reconsider the grant of a public franchise. Judge Moore found 
Cuozzo Speed Techs and Oil States to be particularly persuasive in 
this regard, echoing their obiter that “IPR is ‘simply a 
reconsideration of’ the PTO’s original grant of a public franchise, 
which serves to protect ‘the public’s paramount interest in seeing 
that patent monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope.’”60 
The third factor identified by Judge Moore to distinguish IPR 
from private adjudication was the difference between the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and USPTO procedures in IPR.61 Civil 
litigation allows plaintiffs to significantly amend their complaints, 
and to employ a host of discovery options including interrogatories, 
                                                                                                             
56 Id. at 1327.  
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 1328. 
60 Id. at 1327 (quoting Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 
138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373 (2018)).  
61 Id. at 1328. 
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depositions, production demands, and requests for admission.62 IPR 
petitioners may only make clerical or typographical corrections to 
their petitions, and discovery is limited to the deposition of 
witnesses submitting affidavits or declarations and “what is 
otherwise necessary in the interest of justice.”63 IPR hearings are 
short and rarely permit live testimony, differentiating them 
substantially from civil litigation hearings. The final factor 
identified by Judge Moore to distinguish IPR from private 
adjudication was the similarity between IPR and the other 
“administrative agency reconsideration decisions” issued by the 
USPTO, namely ex parte and inter partes reexamination.64 The 
Tribe had acknowledged in oral argument that sovereign immunity 
would not apply in these proceedings due to their inquisitorial 
nature, and Judge Moore reasoned that IPR’s slightly less 
inquisitorial nature did not preclude it from also being an 
administrative agency reconsideration decision.65 
Judge Moore concluded that, in instituting an IPR, the USPTO 
“is acting as the United States in its role as a superior sovereign to 
reconsider a prior administrative grant and protect the public interest 
in keeping patent monopolies ‘within their legitimate scope.’”66 
Accordingly, the Tribe could not rely on its immunity to bar such an 
action. Judge Dyk, in his concurring opinion, also emphasized the 
important public function of IPR in improving patent quality and 
restoring public confidence in the presumption of patent validity by 
giving the USPTO “‘a second look at an earlier administrative grant 
of a patent.’”67 Judge Dyk provided a painstaking account of the 
legislative history of IPR to illustrate its similarities with ex parte 
and inter partes reexamination, seizing also on the Tribe’s 
concession in oral argument that sovereign immunity would not 
apply in either proceeding. Judge Dyk emphasized the enormous 
                                                                                                             
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 1328 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5) (2012)).  
64 Id. at 1329. 
65 Oral Argument, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018) (No. 2018-1638), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings
?title=&field_case_number_value=18-1638&field_date_value2%5Bvalue
%5D%5Bdate%5D= [https://perma.cc/5VH9-R9PQ]. 
66 Id. (citing Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144).  
67 Id. at 1335 (quoting Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144).  
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responsibility of the USPTO (“the USPTO receives over 600,000 
applications a year”) and its extremely limited resources, leading to 
a lack of public confidence in the patent system and subsequent 
judicial skepticism about patent validity.68 Reexamination, Judge 
Dyk explained, was designed to restore faith in the presumption of 
patent validity which many courts had come to treat as coextensive 
with a presumption of administrative correctness.69 Ex parte 
reexamination was introduced in 1980 “to use the motivation and 
resources of third parties to improve the accuracy of the USPTO’s 
patent process,” followed closely by inter partes reexamination in 
1999.70 The participation of third parties in these processes was 
designed not to simulate an adjudication between private parties, 
Judge Dyk explained, but to leverage the vigilance of competitors in 
the field seeking to invalidate an allegedly defective patent, as well 
as their greater access to relevant prior art resources.71 
In detailing this legislative history, Judge Dyk sought to show 
that the eventual replacement of inter partes reexamination with, 
among other things, inter partes review represented a change in 
name rather than a change in substance. While IPR has some 
features similar to civil litigation, Judge Dyk explained, 
[A]t its core, it retains the purpose and many of the 
procedures of its reexamination ancestors, to which 
everybody agrees sovereign immunity does not 
apply. Inter partes review is an administrative 
proceeding designed to improve patent quality by 
giving the USPTO “a second look at an earlier 
administrative grant of a patent.”72  
For these reasons, Judge Dyk concluded, like its predecessors ex 
parte and inter partes reexamination, IPR is an agency 
reconsideration that enlists third-party assistance and “in such a 
reexamination proceeding, sovereign immunity does not apply.”73 
                                                                                                             
68 Id. at 1331–32. 
69 Id. at 1333. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 1335 (citing Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144).  
73 Id. 
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The court affirmed the PTAB’s decision denying the Tribe’s motion 
to dismiss IPR on the basis of tribal sovereign immunity.74 
It is important to note that the court confined its decision to tribal 
sovereign immunity alone. With respect to state sovereign 
immunity, the court stated that, “[w]hile we recognize there are 
many parallels, we leave for another day the question of whether 
there is any reason to treat state sovereign immunity differently.”75 
Both Judges Moore and Dyk, however, made reference to the 
Supreme Court’s obiter in FMC that state sovereign immunity 
“would not bar the Commission from ‘institut[ing] its own 
administrative proceeding against a state-run port,’ even if that 
proceeding were prompted by ‘information supplied by a private 
party.’”76 Accordingly, whether states can continue to claim 
immunity from IPR after this decision remains to be seen. Arguably, 
the reasoning laid out by the Federal Circuit for barring tribal 
sovereign immunity in IPR should compel a similar result for state 
sovereign immunity, but this issue remains unresolved for now. 
IV. CONSUMER WELFARE LOSS 
The quid pro quo of the patent system lies in the public 
disclosure of a useful invention in exchange for a time-limited 
monopoly on the development, sale, and distribution of this 
invention. The temporal restriction is important because, while this 
monopoly exists, not all members of the public will be able to access 
the patented invention at monopoly prices. The patent’s expiry is 
critical for the entry of generic competitors selling the invention at 
more affordable prices. In the exclusive pursuit of profit, however, 
many patentees have attempted to extend their statutory monopolies 
beyond their rightful term. Pharmaceutical patentees, in particular, 
are notorious for their attempts to extend the duration of their patents 
through evergreening, pay-for-delay agreements, and other 
anticompetitive schemes.77 The unlawful extension of monopoly 
                                                                                                             
74 Id. at 1322. 
75 Id. at 1329. 
76 Id. at 1330 (citing Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 768 
(2002))(emphasis added).  
77 Gregory H. Jones et al., Strategies That Delay or Prevent the Timely Availability of 
Affordable Generic Drugs in the United States, 127 BLOOD J. 1398, 1398 (2016). 
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pricing has significant adverse effects on consumer welfare; 
“approximately one in five Americans do not fill prescriptions 
because of prohibitive cost.”78 Pay-for-delay agreements are 
estimated to cost U.S. taxpayers, insurance companies, and 
consumers approximately $3.5 billion per year.79 Generic drugs, on 
the other hand, have saved the U.S. health care system almost $1.5 
trillion between 2004 and 2013.80 The Federal Trade Commission 
estimates that within one year of market entry, authorized generics 
sell for 15% of the price of brand name equivalents, generating 
significant cost savings for consumers.81 
One of the primary ways in which generic manufacturers can 
actively ensure that patent terms are not unlawfully extended is by 
challenging weak patents at the USPTO.82 The IPR process was 
designed to provide an efficient and affordable venue for generic 
firms to contest the patents held by brand-name pharmaceutical 
firms without recourse to expensive and lengthy litigation.83 Under 
this system, introduced with the America Invents Act in 2012, any 
third party (not just a competitor in the same market) can petition 
the USPTO for review of a patent on the basis that it fails to meet 
the requirements for patentability.84 By relocating patent disputes 
before an administrative body rather than a judge or jury, IPR was 
intended to reduce the time, cost, and uncertainty of patent 
litigation.85 Although any third party can file a petition,86 the scope 
of the inquiry is limited to the validity of the patent, not any 
                                                                                                             
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 1399. 
80 Id. at 1398. 
81 Complaint and Jury Trial Demand at 13, In re Restasis (Cyclosporine Ophthalmic 
Emulsion) Antitrust Litig. (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-02907), 2018 WL 
2252507, at *7. 
82 Jones et al., supra note 77, at 1401. 
83 Inter Partes Review, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process
/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/inter-partes-review (last visited Feb. 25, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/XL2U-ASK5]. 
84 See 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2012); Brian T. Apel, Note, An Administrative Meter Maid: 
Using Inter Partes Review and Post-Grant Review to Curb Exclusivity Parking Via the 
“Failure to Market” Provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 114 MICH. L. REV. 107, 115 
(2015). 
85 Apel, supra note 84, at 115.  
86 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2012). 
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allegations of infringement,87 and a final decision must be issued 
within a year.88 In contrast, the median time to trial in patent 
litigation is two and a half years.89 Additionally, the threshold for 
initiating an IPR (“reasonable likelihood” that the petitioner will 
prevail)90 is higher than that required for district court litigation (a 
“short and plain statement” showing entitlement to relief),91 
reducing the likelihood of frivolous petitioning creating a backlog 
of cases.92 Once the IPR has been instituted, however, proof of 
invalidity only requires a preponderance of the evidence,93 rather 
than the “clear and convincing” evidence required by the district 
court to overcome the presumption of validity.94 Additionally, 
unlike in federal courts, claims are given the “broadest reasonable 
construction in light of the specification” (meaning they are more 
likely to overlap with prior art),95 and there is no presumption of 
validity. IPRs are estimated to incur fees of approximately $300,000 
to $500,000 due to their limited duration and scope, whereas patent 
litigation can require several million dollars.96 Finally, the 
institution of an IPR is often successfully utilized by defendants to 
seek a stay of any co-pending infringement litigation relating to the 
same patent, thereby freezing district court litigation costs.97 
                                                                                                             
87 35 U.S.C. § 311 (b) (2012). The scope of discovery is also limited relative to that 
permitted in the district court. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5), with FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(1). 
88 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11). 
89 Apel, supra note 84, at 125. 
90 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012). 
91 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
92 Apel, supra note 84, at 124. 
93 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). 
94 See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (presumption of validity); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. 
P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 97 (2011) (“Under the Federal Circuit’s reading of § 282, a defendant 
seeking to overcome [the presumption of patent validity] must persuade the factfinder of 
its in-validity defense by clear and convincing evidence.”). 
95 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2018). 
96 Apel, supra note 84, at 125–26. 
97 Matthew Rizzolo et al., Shielded by Sovereignty: The Implications for Patentees of 
Covidien v. University of Florida Research Foundation and its Progeny, 45 AIPLA Q.J. 
593, 601–02 (2017). 
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Illustrating its popularity, over 7,573 IPRs were filed between 2012 
and 2018.98 
The ability to invalidate patents prior to the end of their term is 
critical to ensuring that invalid patents do not deter market entry, 
distort innovation, reduce competition, decrease consumer 
welfare,99 and undermine public confidence in the patent bargain. 
While the grant of a patent creates a presumption of validity, it is 
capable of being rebutted. The Hatch–Waxman framework 
deliberately introduced incentives for generic manufacturers to 
challenge the validity of brand name patents, for example, by 
obviating the need to repeat safety and efficacy tests when filing an 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) demonstrating 
bioequivalence to an approved drug.100 ANDA applicants must 
demonstrate that no patent would be infringed by the granting of the 
ANDA either because (i.) no patent exists; (ii.) the patent has 
expired; (iii.) the patent will soon expire; or (iv.) the patent is 
invalid.101 Hatch-Waxman incentivized patent challenges under 
paragraph IV by granting 180 days of market exclusivity to generic 
manufacturers who successfully challenged patents under this 
process (the so-called “first filer” advantage).102 
Accordingly, Elana Williams argues that Allergan’s attempt to 
unlawfully extend its Restasis® monopoly by avoiding invalidation 
through IPR is “exactly what Congress in enacting the Hatch-
Waxman Act sought to avoid.”103 Generic competitors “must be 
allowed to enter the market through Congressionally created 
mechanisms such as IPR in order to provide consumers with low-
cost options to the medications they desperately need.”104 
Weaponizing tribal sovereign immunity to shield corporate 
                                                                                                             
98 Patent Trial & Appeal Bd., Trial Statistics: IPR, PGR, CBM, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. 3 (Feb.2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial_statistics
_20180228.pdf [https://perma.cc/MEZ8-7FHL]. 
99 Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 
MINN. L. REV. 101, 114 (2006). 
100 Apel, supra note 84, at 109, 111–12. 
101 Apel, supra note 84, at 112–13. 
102 Apel, supra note 84, at 109. 
103 Elana Williams, Note, Tribal Sovereign Immunity as a Defense in Overcoming IPR 
Challenges of Brand Name Pharmaceutical Patent Validity at PTAB—Effects on the 
Industry, 18 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 40 , 57 (2018). 
104 Id. at 58. 
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monopoly power from generic competition has significant 
anticompetitive effects, including a welfare loss for consumers. It 
inflates the probabilistic value of Allergan’s patents beyond that 
created by the initial grant of market exclusivity by artificially 
eliminating sources of competition, in this case, generic firms.105 By 
shielding weak patents from potential invalidation through inter 
partes review, Allergan is extending its market monopoly beyond its 
rightful limits, thereby maintaining price inflation and harming 
consumers who cannot afford Restasis® at current prices. 
In a separate judgment accompanying his invalidation of 
Allergan’s Restasis® patents for obviousness, U.S. Circuit Judge 
William Bryson criticized Allergan’s assignment of its patents to the 
Tribe: “[w]hat Allergan seeks is the right to continue to enjoy the 
considerable benefits of the U.S. patent system without accepting 
the limits that Congress has placed on those benefits through the 
administrative mechanism for canceling invalid patents.”106 Judge 
Bryson expressed concern that Allergan’s strategy would be adopted 
by other pharmaceutical firms also seeking to shield their patents 
from administrative review: “[i]f that ploy succeeds, any patentee 
facing IPR proceedings would presumably be able to defeat those 
proceedings by employing the same artifice. In short, Allergan’s 
tactic, if successful, could spell the end of the PTO’s IPR program, 
which was a central component of the America Invents Act of 
2011.”107 Judge Bryson compared Allergan’s patent assignment to 
abusive tax shelter transactions, in which courts have “looked 
behind the face of the transactions to determine whether the 
transactions have economic substance or are simply a method of 
gaming the . . . system to generate benefits that were not intended to 
be available.”108 
A coalition of American health care organizations expressed 
similar concern at the harm posed by Allergan’s transaction to 
consumer welfare: 
                                                                                                             
105 Cecilia (Yixi) Cheng & Theodore T. Lee, When Patents Are Sovereigns: The 
Competitive Harms of Leasing Tribal Immunity, 127 YALE L.J. F. 848, 852 (2018). 
106 Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, 
at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at *3. 
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The actions taken by Allergan to ensure that patients 
and payors do not benefit from timely generic 
competition to Restasis® is an alarming new 
example of the steps that brand name drug companies 
will take to put profits above the public interest . . . . 
If left unchallenged, this potentially precedent-
setting transfer of patents to Native American tribes 
to avoid lawful review of these government-granted 
monopolies may represent the beginning of a 
lucrative business strategy at the expense of the 
public interest, thus jeopardizing timely access to 
lower-cost generic and biosimilar medicines.109 
Dallas-based lawyer Michael Shore, who brokered the Allergan-
Tribe assignment, however, has been candid about his desire to 
“destroy the IPR process” by creating sufficient loopholes to compel 
congressional review.110 On a Teleforum podcast aired in January 
2018, he explained his intention to carve out such a loophole that 
“anyone can go to a sovereign, whether it’s a state sovereign or a 
tribal sovereign, and get in a time machine and go back to 2011,” 
prior to the introduction of the America Invents Act.111 His 
motivation, he explained, was to make the IPR system “more fair” 
by eliminating the “huge arbitrage in value between sovereigns and 
non-sovereigns.”112 Shore believes that the IPR process “grossly 
favors infringers,” to the detriment of patent holders. He describes 
the “insanity” of a process in which “no patent is presumed valid, 
no matter how much you’ve invested in it, no matter how much work 
you’ve done on it.”113 He argues that the introduction of the IPR 
process has “literally destroyed” the U.S. patent system, and he is 
simply trying to “take us back to a time when we had the number 
one innovative economy in the world.”114 Shore believes that the 
invalidation of patents through district court litigation is preferable 
                                                                                                             
109 All. of Cmty. Health Plans et al., supra note 21, at 3. 
110 New Frontiers for Tribal Immunity: Patents, Pharmaceuticals, and the PTAB, THE 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Jan. 30, 2018), https://fedsoc.org/events/new-frontiers-for-tribal-
immunity-patents-pharmaceuticals-and-the-ptab [https://perma.cc/5YZX-JJGU]. 
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to the IPR process because of the legal protections that exist for 
patentees: the ordinary person skilled in the art standard, a jury, a 
presumption of validity, the ability to cross-examine expert 
testimony, and a “clear and convincing evidence” standard.115 
Shore’s arguments echo Allergan’s defense of its transaction as 
protection against the “double jeopardy” of fielding both federal 
lawsuits and IPR proceedings.116 Ironically, however, in 2016, at a 
time when pharmaceutical firms were facing heightened media, 
political, and regulatory scrutiny (largely thanks to the public antics 
of “pharma bro” Martin Shkreli),117 Allergan publicly committed to 
a “social contract” with patients, which promised that Allergan 
would “not engage in price gouging actions or predatory pricing,” 
would “enhance access” for patients, and would limit annual price 
increases in line with inflation.118 Whatever goodwill was generated 
by this social contract was quickly consumed by the media storm 
that followed the announcement of the Allergan-Tribe transaction in 
2017. Public shifts in the access policies of pharmaceutical firms 
seem more closely tied to swings in public sentiment than 
underlying changes in corporate policy; particularly those tied to the 
generation of profit for shareholders. Resultingly, consumer welfare 
continues to weather significant losses. 
In November 2017, Restasis® purchasers filed an antitrust suit 
against Allergan, claiming damages for its anticompetitive 
conduct.119 The class action claims that, 
In the absence of Allergan’s unlawful actions, 
generic Restasis® would have been available by 
                                                                                                             
115 Id. 
116 Sy Mukherjee, Botox Maker Allergan’s CEO Defends Selling Drug Patents to Native 
American Tribe to Thwart Rivals, FORTUNE (Sept. 9, 2017), 
http://fortune.com/2017/09/09/allergan-drug-patents-native-american/ 
[https://perma.cc/5FSY-5YS3]. 
117 See, e.g., Andrew Pollack & Matthew Goldstein, Martin Shkreli All but Gloated Over 
Huge Drug Price Increases, Memos Show, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/03/business/drug-makers-calculated-price-increases-
with-profit-in-mind-memos-show.html [https://perma.cc/JC7W-B3GX]. 
118 Brent Saunders, Our Social Contract with Patients, ALLERGAN: CEO BLOG (Sept. 6, 
2016), https://www.allergan.com/news/ceo-blog/september-2016/our-social-contract-with
-patients [https://perma.cc/4VJ5-ABCK]. 
119 Class Action Complaint & Jury Trial Demand, FWK Holdings, LLC v. Allergan, Inc., 
No. 2:17-cv-00747 (E.D. Tex. 2017). 
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May 17, 2014 and direct purchasers would have 
purchased the less expensive generic. FWK 
Holdings, LLC and the proposed class have paid 
hundreds of millions of dollars in overcharges as a 
result of Allergan’s anticompetitive scheme.120 
Six months later, a similar suit was brought against Allergan by 
four major U.S. retailers: Walgreen Co., Kroger, Albertsons and 
HEB. The antitrust action alleges that Allergan’s anticompetitive 
conduct (including the patent assignment to the Tribe) “had the 
purpose and effect of restraining competition unreasonably and 
injuring competition by protecting Restasis® from generic 
competition,” with the effect that the plaintiffs were “compelled to 
pay, did pay, and continue to pay, artificially inflated prices for their 
[Restasis] requirements” and have incurred “substantial injury to 
their business and property in the form of overcharges.”121 These 
lawsuits reflect the ripple effects of the Allergan-Tribe transaction, 
not just in terms of the harm to consumers (reduced access to 
affordable medicines) but also in terms of the anticompetitive 
effects on purchasers and retailers. 
V. HISTORY OF ECONOMIC OPPRESSION OF  
AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES 
Allergan’s attempt to protect $1.4 billion122 in annual sales of a 
blockbuster drug by renting a legal protection designed for a 
historically disenfranchised community represents a new frontier in 
abuses of the patent system. Perhaps more disturbingly, however, it 
reflects the limited utility of this legal protection to a community 
with insufficient economic opportunities. 
Tribal sovereign immunity, like that of states, finds its roots in 
the common law. The doctrine developed out of the “international 
public law doctrine of nation-state sovereign immunity,” and the 
                                                                                                             
120 Class Action Complaint & Jury Trial Demand at 3, FWK Holdings, LLC v. Allergan, 
Inc., 2017 WL 5513947 (E.D. Tex.) (No. 2:17-cv-00747).  
121 Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, supra note 81, at 37 para. 109, 39 paras. 115–16. 
122 Allergan, Plc, Annual Report: 2017 Form 10-K, ALLERGAN 59 (Feb. 16, 2018), 
https://allergan-web-cdn-
prod.azureedge.net/actavis/actavis/media/allerganinvestors/financial-information/proxy-
materials/10-k-2017 [https://perma.cc/42F5-34ZX]. 
788         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:767 
 
need to protect the dignity of sovereigns, as well as their 
treasuries.123 The United States Supreme Court first formally 
recognized tribal sovereign immunity in the early twentieth century 
in cases involving the Cherokee Nation, the Choctaw Nation, and 
the Creek Nation.124 In these early cases, judicial recognition of the 
sovereignty of Indian tribes often referenced as “indicators” of 
sovereignty their political organization, independent legislatures, 
exclusive territorial domain, treaties with the United States, distinct 
political community, and written laws and constitutions.125 Prior to 
the formation of the United States, the British Crown had interacted 
with Indian tribes as foreign sovereigns for the purposes of 
commercial trade, negotiation, diplomacy, and treaty-making.126 
Even after Congress changed its policy from diplomacy to 
regulation in 1871, Indian tribes retained the sovereignty inherent in 
their status as self-governing peoples predating the U.S. 
Constitution.127 In its current form, the boundaries of tribal 
sovereign immunity lie where tribes have consented to being sued 
or Congress has unequivocally expressed128 its intent to abrogate the 
scope of the immunity.129 State sovereign immunity arises from the 
states’ inherent sovereignty prior to ratification of the U.S. 
Constitution and is affirmed by the Eleventh Amendment.130 Tribal 
                                                                                                             
123 William Wood, It Wasn’t an Accident: The Tribal Sovereignty Immunity Story, 62 
AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1610, 1615 (2013); see also Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition 
and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and 
Normative Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 37 
TULSA L. REV. 661, 662–63 (2002). 
124 Wood, supra note 123, at 1622–23; see, e.g., United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 
309 U.S. 506 (1940); Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919). 
125 See Wood, supra note 123, at 1627–28. 
126 Seielstad, supra note 123, at 684. 
127 Id. at 686. 
128 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58–59 (1978). 
129 Ryan Seelau, In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity: A Pragmatic Look at the 
Doctrine as a Tool for Strengthening Tribal Courts, 90 N.D. L. REV. 121, 138–39 (2014). 
130 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (“We have . . . sometimes referred to the 
States’ immunity from suit as ‘Eleventh Amendment immunity.’ The phrase is convenient 
shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity of the States neither 
derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, as the 
Constitution’s structure, its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make 
clear, the States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the 
States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today 
(either literally or by virtue of their admission into the Union upon an equal footing with 
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sovereign immunity, however, receives no constitutional protection. 
As a result, both Congress and the Executive Branch have played a 
greater role in defining the contours of tribal immunity.131 Yet, 
Gregory Ablavsky argues that the justifications for sovereign 
immunity “apply with as much or greater force in the tribal context” 
than they do in the state context.132 When compared to U.S. states, 
Native nations continue to have substantially less capital and less 
capacity to raise capital through taxation.133 More than 26% of 
American Indians and Alaskan Natives lived in poverty in 2016, the 
highest of any racial group.134 In these circumstances, the function 
of sovereign immunity to protect sovereign treasuries from the 
financial burden of litigation increases in importance. 
Recent decisions of the PTAB, however, reflect preferential 
treatment of state sovereign immunity when used to shield patents 
owned by state universities from inter partes review. In May 2017, 
the PTAB granted the University of Maryland’s motion to terminate 
IPR proceedings on the basis of its sovereign immunity as an “arm 
of the State of Maryland.”135 Four months earlier, the PTAB had 
dismissed another IPR proceeding due to the Florida Research 
Foundation’s sovereign immunity.136 The PTAB’s willingness to 
dismiss IPR petitions for patents owned by state sovereigns was 
precisely what motivated Michael Shore to broker the Allergan-
Tribe transaction in the belief that tribal immunity would receive 
similar treatment.137 The basis for the PTAB’s differential treatment 
                                                                                                             
the other States) except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional 
Amendments.”); see also Gregory J. Wong, Intent Matters: Assessing Sovereign Immunity 
for Tribal Entities, 82 WASH. L. REV. 205, 209 (2007). 
131 Seielstad, supra note 123, at 675. 
132 New Frontiers for Tribal Immunity: Patents, Pharmaceuticals, and the PTAB, supra 
note 110. 
133 Seelau, supra note 129, at 140. 
134 U.S. Census Bureau, American Indian and Alaska Native Heritage Month: November 
2017, PROFILE AM. FACTS FOR FEATURES 5 (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.census.gov
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135 See NeoChord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., Balt., No. IPR2016-00208, at 4 (P.T.A.B. May 
23, 2017). 
136 See Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., Nos. IPR2016-01274, 
IPR2016-01275, IPR2016-01276, at 3 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017). 
137 See Gregory Ablavsky & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Selling Patents to Indian Tribes 
to Delay the Market Entry of Generic Drugs, 178 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 179, 179 (2018). 
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of state and tribal immunity remains unclear; the Board referred to 
statements by the Supreme Court that “the immunity possessed by 
Indian Tribes is not coextensive with that of the States,”138 and 
argued that lower courts, therefore, have “not always considered 
Supreme Court precedent concerning state sovereign immunity to 
be applicable in the context of tribal immunity.”139 The PTAB then 
referred to obiter from Kiowa (“‘[t]here are reasons to doubt the 
wisdom of perpetuating the [tribal immunity] doctrine’”) and “the 
recognized differences between the state sovereign immunity and 
tribal immunity doctrines” (without further elucidation) before 
denying the Tribe’s motion to dismiss the IPR proceedings.140 
Some distinguishing characteristics between Covidien, 
NeoChord, and the present case may be illustrative. Firstly, at the 
time that the IPR was originally initiated, the relevant patents in 
Covidien and NeoChord were already owned by a sovereign, unlike 
the present case, in which ownership changed hands after the IPR 
had already been instituted, clearly for the purpose of dismissing the 
proceedings.141 Secondly, Eleventh Amendment immunity is 
considered a valid defense to adjudicative administrative 
proceedings brought by a private party,142 and tribal immunity does 
not enjoy such constitutional protection.143 Thirdly, the unique 
fiduciary relationship between the federal government and Indian 
“domestic dependent nations”144 has been held to bar the invocation 
of sovereign immunity. The Ninth Circuit has noted that “tribal 
immunity is generally not asserted in administrative proceedings 
because tribes cannot impose sovereign immunity to bar the federal 
                                                                                                             
138 Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998). 
139 Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. IPR2016-01127, at 9, 2018 WL 
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140 Id. at 10, 2018 WL 1100950, at *4. 
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proceedings and civil litigation, we hold that state sovereign immunity bars the FMC from 
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government from exercising its trust obligations,” and that “tribal 
sovereignty does not extend to prevent the federal government from 
exercising its superior sovereign powers.”145 The significance of 
these differences has yet to be tested; the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit explicitly confined its decision to tribal 
sovereign immunity alone, and left the differential treatment of state 
sovereign immunity “for another day.”146 
Certainly, the policy reasons for denying the application of 
sovereign immunity that has been “rented” by private corporations 
to avoid administrative review should apply equally to state 
sovereigns. As the Oglala Sioux Tribe argued in its amicus brief, 
comparing the role of the University of Florida Research Foundation 
to that of the Tribe in this case, “[b]oth merely took an assignment 
of the patent or patents in question for purposes of monetizing the 
patents through licensing and generating royalty revenue.”147 
Indeed, Michael Shore has expressed his intent, if Congress limits 
tribal immunity in inter partes review, to shift patent portfolios to 
state universities (e.g. underfunded historically black colleges) to 
exploit their state sovereign immunity.148 Faced with the same 
concerns regarding corporate abuse of the patent system, the 
technical differences between state and tribal sovereign immunity 
do not seem to justify disabling tribal immunity in inter partes 
review while preserving that of states.149 
In fact, the differential treatment of state and tribal immunity in 
these circumstances suggests a broader delegitimization of this core 
legal protection for tribal communities. William Wood argues that 
the Supreme Court’s mischaracterization of the development of 
tribal sovereign immunity “almost by accident” in Kiowa150 has 
triggered a broader jurisprudential trend of delegitimizing tribal 
                                                                                                             
145 Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 F.3d 1456, 1459 (9th Cir. 1994). 
146 Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1329  
(Fed. Cir. 2018). See supra Part IV.  
147 Oglala Sioux Tribe Brief, supra note 15, at 12. 
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YORKER (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/11/20/why-is-
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149 See generally Ablavsky & Ouellette, supra note 137. 
150 Wood, supra note 123, at 1589–90 (citing Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 
523 U.S. 751, 752 (1998)). 
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sovereign immunity, in which lower federal courts and state 
supreme courts are more willing to “carve out exceptions to the 
doctrine” and “make their own policy judgments about whether 
immunity should apply—and to tip the balance against upholding 
immunity.”151 In TTEA v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo,152 for example, the 
Fifth Circuit noted that Kiowa provided reasons to “doubt the 
wisdom” of perpetuating tribal sovereign immunity, and held that 
this immunity “did not bar an action seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief against the tribe.”153 Wood argues that exceptions 
to the application of tribal sovereign immunity have similarly been 
carved out by courts in California and Oklahoma on the basis of 
Kiowa obiter.154 Kiowa’s criticism of the “wisdom of perpetuating 
the doctrine” of tribal immunity,155 Wood claims, has encouraged 
lower courts to place limitations on tribal immunity despite its 
longstanding congressional recognition.156 
Certainly, the PTAB’s February decision to deny the operation 
of tribal sovereign immunity in inter partes review significantly 
curtails the operability of a core legal protection for American 
Indians, with unpredictable consequences. Retaining meaningful 
control over whether sovereign immunity is waived or invoked can 
have a significant impact on the capacity and legitimacy of tribal 
court systems, as well as the scope of their jurisdiction.157 Preserving 
tribal immunity allows tribes to strengthen and develop their own 
legal systems, for example, by reincorporating traditional norms 
which may have been removed through the colonization of tribal 
justice systems (e.g. alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, 
such as peacemaker courts, and internal grievance procedures).158 
Immunity from suit remains a core legal protection and should not 
be lightly curtailed. As Andrea Seielstad reiterates, tribal immunity 
“derives its existence from the presumed and long-recognized 
                                                                                                             
151 Wood, supra note 123, at 1591. 
152 181 F.3d 676 (5th Cir. 1999). 
153 Wood, supra note 123, at 1599 (citing TTEA v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, 181 F. 3d 676 
(5th Cir. 1999)).  
154 Id. at 1602–03. 
155 Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 758. 
156 See Wood, supra note 123, at 1662. 
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inherent sovereignty of Indian nations. The doctrine is not easily 
disturbed, and interpretive deviations from the general rule should 
be cautiously undertaken.”159 Any challenge to such immunity must 
confront a “longstanding inter-branch jurisprudential legacy” that 
has “consistently endorsed a federal policy and jurisprudence 
protective of tribal immunity.”160 While the PTAB’s anxiety to 
preclude abuses of the patent system is understandable, abrogating 
tribal sovereign immunity without congressional oversight is not the 
solution. 
Interestingly, in Covidien, the PTAB had earlier dismissed the 
argument that immunizing patents owned by sovereigns would have 
“harmful and far-reaching consequences,” as invalid patents would 
stand simply because they were assigned to sovereign entities.161 
The Board was unpersuaded that “an application of sovereign 
immunity to inter partes review [would] do violence to the patent 
system” and stated that “there is no evidence that the harm to the 
patent system, described by the Petitioner, will come to pass, let 
alone exists as a basis to divest States of sovereign immunity.”162 
Yet, less than a month later, the Board handed down a very different 
decision in which it denied the application of tribal immunity to inter 
partes review on the basis of seemingly trivial differences between 
state and tribal immunity.163 It is possible that the media storm and 
public outrage which followed the announcement of the Allergan-
Tribe transaction may have contributed to a shift in perception of the 
social utility of immunizing patents held by sovereigns, but this 
remains speculation. 
The technology transfer offices of public universities are 
reportedly concerned that the trendline of recent cases, namely, the 
PTAB’s February decision and the Federal Circuit’s July decision, 
may ultimately sprout federal legislation which abrogates all 
sovereign immunity before the PTAB, thereby “crippling” the 
innovation spurred by the Bayh-Dole Act and imposing significant 
                                                                                                             
159 Id. at 704. 
160 Id. at 772. 
161 Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., Nos. IPR2016-01274, IPR2016-
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financial burdens on state universities as they are forced to defend 
themselves before inter partes review.164 If the financial burdens of 
sovereigns were to legitimately influence a decision to shield them 
from inter partes review, however, surely the dire financial 
circumstances of American Indian tribes would be more compelling. 
A small community in upstate New York with an annual budget of 
only $50 million to support 13,000 people,165 the Saint Regis 
Mohawk Tribe had already agreed to hold supercomputer patents 
for SRC Labs as part of its economic diversification strategy.166 
SRC Labs had transferred its patents to the Tribe in August 2017 in 
order to use tribal immunity as a shield from counter-challenge 
through inter partes review. In October 2017, the Tribe filed lawsuits 
against Microsoft and Amazon for infringement of these patents.167 
The Tribe’s willingness to rent its sovereign immunity to patent 
holders in exchange for upfront payments reflects the financial 
strain of a legacy of colonial oppression of American Indians 
through federal policy and judicial decisions.168 The effective 
promotion of tribal self-sufficiency, sovereignty, and political self-
determination relies in large part on economic independence from 
federal funds. And despite popular misconceptions, Indian gaming 
revenue is unevenly distributed and largely insufficient.169 Of the 
562 federally recognized Indian Nations, less than half operate 
gaming facilities.170 And on the thirtieth anniversary of the Indian 
                                                                                                             
164 BIO 2018: Allergan-Tribe Deal Just the Start, says Former USPTO Director, LIFE 
SCI. INTELL. PROP. REV. (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.lifesciencesipreview.com/news/bio-
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and Microsoft, SLATE (Oct. 19, 2017, 12:25 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs
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Development in First Nations Country, 1 INDIGENOUS NATIONS STUD. J. 95, 96 (2000). 
169 Oglala Sioux Tribe Brief, supra note 15, at 6. 
170 2018 Annual Report, NAT’L INDIAN GAMING ASS’N 25 (Apr. 30, 2018), 
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Gaming Regulatory Act,171 billions of dollars in gaming revenue 
have failed to systematically reduce tribal poverty levels (the 
median poverty rate for gaming tribes in Washington, Oregon, 
Idaho, and Alaska actually increased over 2000-2010 from 25% to 
29%, despite $19 billion in gaming revenue), and there is evidence 
of an inverse correlation between per capita payments and poverty 
reduction.172 Additionally, taxation revenue from businesses located 
on Indian reservations has been crowded out by parallel state 
taxation powers.173 Dual taxation forces tribes to reduce their tax 
rates or forfeit tax revenue altogether in order to maintain market 
pricing, yet the threat of double taxation continues to frighten 
investors away.174 Despite tribal taxation powers representing “an 
essential attribute of Indian sovereignty,”175 tribes’ ability to 
generate taxation revenue or offer tax incentives to stimulate 
economic activity has been sharply curtailed by “flexible 
preemption analysis” decisions.176 Naturally, in these 
circumstances, tribes seeking additional revenue streams to support 
the needs of their members are more willing to “rent” their sovereign 
immunity for financial reward. The Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe has 
acknowledged that the upfront payment of $13.75 million followed 
by quarterly royalty payments of $3.75 million from Allergan will 
allow it “to address some of the chronically unmet needs of the 
Akwesasne community, such as housing, employment, education, 
healthcare, cultural and language preservation.”177 
Interestingly, the Tribe’s participation in this transaction has 
also been justified, not only by its significant economic needs, but 
by the long history of unlawful appropriation of Native American 
inventions in the United States. The Native American Intellectual 
Property Enterprise Council, in its amicus brief to the PTAB, 
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justified the assignment of Restasis® patents to the Tribe on the 
basis that 
Appropriation and outright theft of Native American 
inventions and ideas without attribution has occurred 
for hundreds of years. The curing of rubber, the game 
of Lacrosse, tortillas, potato chips, root beer, and 
innumerable planting, cultivation, crossbreeding, 
and cooking techniques and inventions were all 
Native American in origin, yet the Tribes saw little 
or no benefits aside from occasional lip service.178 
Framing Allergan’s patent assignment as a form of 
intergenerational equity (when in fact its only purpose was to protect 
Allergan’s Restasis® revenue) suggests an alarming form of 
vigilante justice that should not be encouraged. Denying U.S. 
patients access to affordable generic medicines in order to remedy 
the historical deprivation of intellectual property rights to Native 
American tribes seems like a misguided attempt to correct one 
wrong by committing another. Justifying abuse of the patent system 
“in order to overcome significant historical disadvantages”179 faced 
by Native American tribes is misdirected and unsustainable. 
Certainly, the U.S. government should be doing more to compensate 
Indian tribes for centuries of oppression, discrimination, and 
resource appropriation, but back-door vigilantism by means of 
crippling inter partes review is not an appropriate remedy. 
Understanding the motivation for tribal participation in this 
transaction does not diminish its effect on consumer welfare and the 
underlying patent bargain. In granting patent rights, society agreed 
to provide inventors with a time-limited monopoly in return for the 
release of information concerning socially beneficial innovation. 
The financial needs and historical suffering of American Indians, 
while important, have no bearing on this bargain. For this reason, 
inter partes review cannot and should not be manipulated to serve 
extraneous objectives while there continue to exist alternative (and 
more appropriate) means of achieving them. 
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VI. LOOKING FORWARD 
The harms caused by the commodification of sovereign 
immunity for corporate profit (including the loss to consumer 
welfare and the narrowing of tribal immunity) demonstrate that 
sustainable solutions are needed for the future. Identifying the 
optimal solution, however, is extremely difficult. Scholars at Yale 
argue that patent assignments that make no economic sense but for 
their anticompetitive purpose (in this case, shielding patents from 
invalidation by generic competitors) should be subject to antitrust 
scrutiny.180 Cheng and Lee argue that bringing an antitrust suit to 
challenge an anticompetitive patent assignment would be a “natural 
extension” of FTC v. Actavis, in which the Supreme Court held that 
antitrust law can apply to reverse payment agreements between 
brand name and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers.181 The “no 
economic sense” test, they argue, would capture the most egregious 
anticompetitive conduct without unduly eroding sovereign 
immunity, or chilling legitimate patent transfers.182 This would 
prevent abuse of the patent system by prohibiting anticompetitive 
patent assignments without touching the question of sovereign 
immunity. 
Alternatively, bipartisan legislation has been proposed that 
would strip both states and tribes of sovereign immunity in inter 
partes review. The Preserving Access to Cost Effective Drugs Act 
(the “PACED Act”), introduced in March 2018 by Senators Cotton, 
McCaskill, Perdue, Ernst, and Toomey, would amend title 35 of the 
United States Code to provide that “a patent owner may not assert 
sovereign immunity, including the sovereign immunity accorded to 
an Indian tribe” in derivation, reexamination, inter partes review, 
and post-grant review proceedings (and federal reviews thereof), but 
“only to the extent permitted under the 11th amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States.”183 Whether such statutory 
language would be sufficient to abrogate state sovereign 
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immunity,184 or whether the actual effect of the PACED Act would 
be to exclusively penalize tribes while permitting states to continue 
invoking immunity, remains to be seen. The Bill has been referred 
to the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
An alternative solution, suggested by Greg Ablavsky and Lisa 
Ouellette, would be to encourage states to waive immunity in inter 
partes review by making the receipt of federal research funds 
conditioned upon such a waiver.185 Given the importance of federal 
funding to the continuity of university-based research and 
development, this incentive could be persuasive. Jennifer Polse, 
focusing on patent infringement proceedings in federal court, 
originally argued that conditioning the receipt of federal research 
funds on the waiver of sovereign immunity in patent suits would 
ensure that federal funds are not used to violate federal patent law.186 
According to Polse, obtaining a waiver from states in this manner is 
the only way to hold state universities accountable for patent 
infringement after Florida Prepaid II effectively “close[d] the door 
to future legislative attempts to abrogate state immunity from suit 
for patent infringement.”187 Importantly, to avoid triggering the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions (in which the significant 
financial inducement of a federal research grant may effectively 
coerce states into giving up their constitutional rights),188 a modified 
solution would be to withhold only a percentage of federal research 
funds from states which refuse to waive their immunity in inter 
partes review.189 
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In its departure from its intended purpose, the monetization of 
tribal sovereign immunity clearly reflects the desperate state of 
tribal finances.190 Accordingly, a more sustainable means of 
discouraging anticompetitive patent transfers would involve 
identifying alternative revenue streams for American Indian tribes. 
As aforementioned, tribal taxation revenue has been severely 
decimated by the threat of double taxation due to increasingly 
generous judicial interpretations of state taxation powers. If, 
however, Congress were to grant immunities from state tax in 
specific contexts (as it did with gaming under the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act),191 it would significantly bolster tribal revenue 
streams on a sustainable, long-term basis.192 Natural resource 
development represents a significant revenue stream for many 
tribes, and there exists tremendous potential to generate renewable 
energy through wind and solar power.193 Indian lands hold an 
estimated 535 billion kWh/year of wind and 17,600 billion 
kWh/year of solar-energy potential.194 Yet harnessing this energy 
requires capital-intensive technologies and non-Indian investment, 
which again raises the specter of double taxation.195 Tribes do not 
enjoy the renewable energy tax credits, accelerated depreciation 
allowances, and loan guarantees that make renewable energy 
projects profitable for investors.196 Additionally, as tribes are 
generally excluded from regional transmission line planning, 
transmission lines often skirt tribal lands, and the cost of relocating 
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or extending these lines closer to tribal lands would be 
prohibitive.197 Renewable energy investment, therefore, represents 
a significant source of untapped tribal revenue and employment. If 
Congress were to establish immunities from state tax for renewable 
energy developments, this exemption would significantly bolster 
tribal revenue streams and obviate the need to monetize sovereign 
immunity.198 Discouraging imitation of the Allergan-Tribe 
transaction “requires more than a stopgap narrowly focused on the 
use of tribal sovereign immunity in inter partes review proceedings 
challenging drug patents.”199 It requires sustainable, long-term 
solutions which address the root causes that motivate these 
transactions, namely, serious financial need. 
A more compelling but likely less feasible solution would be to 
return title to Indian land to tribes under a new status that confers 
permanent jurisdiction and full taxation powers.200 The U.S. 
government’s ownership of Indian land (held in trust for tribes)201 
means that tribes cannot sell, lease, develop, or mortgage their land 
without the express approval of the U.S. government, which 
unreasonably burdens and hinders tribal entrepreneurship and 
economic development.202 In addition to erecting significant 
bureaucratic barriers to economic growth, the trust status of Indian 
resources “freezes” tribal assets in a pre-capitalist state.203 The 
Indian Trust Asset Reform Act, for example, allows participating 
tribes to assume responsibility for the management of trust assets 
according to tribal standards, notwithstanding federal regulations.204 
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This step, although small, could represent the start of a “new 
approach to tribal self-determination that would allow for greater 
tribal authority and flexibility in the management of trust assets, 
including surface and potentially subsurface resources for energy 
development.”205 Greater legislative creativity and courage could 
significantly alter the pattern of tribal engagement with their 
resources and reclaim the control and self-determination that has 
been denied them for centuries. This paper is not the appropriate 
place to discuss the incredibly complex and controversial issues 
relating to tribal land held in trust by the United States. Suffice to 
say that, rather than narrowing the scope of an important legal 
protection for American Indian tribes, a more effective deterrent to 
future imitations of the Allergan-Tribe transaction would be to 
significantly buttress the economic opportunities afforded to 
American Indian communities in a sustainable and meaningful 
fashion. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Although the optimal resolution of the issues raised herein 
remains unclear, two conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing 
discussion. Firstly, pharmaceutical firms should not be permitted to 
rent sovereign immunity (state or tribal) in order to extend their 
patent monopolies beyond their lawful terms, to the detriment of 
U.S. consumers. The effective functions of inter partes review 
should be preserved in order to maintain consumer access to 
affordable generic medicines. Secondly, the willingness of the Saint 
Regis Mohawk Tribe to rent its sovereign immunity in return for 
lump-sum payments reflects the dire financial circumstances of 
many Indian tribes and the economic legacy of centuries of 
oppression. These financial needs should be addressed, not by 
curtailing the scope of an already limited legal protection, but by 
identifying sustainable, long-term sources of tribal revenue that 
would obviate the financial need to engage in anticompetitive patent 
assignments with pharmaceutical firms. Unless and until Congress 
acts to reverse centuries of economic oppression of American 
Indians, these transactions will continue to be lucrative for tribes, 
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and U.S. consumers will continue to suffer a lack of access to 
affordable medicines. 
 
